Andy’s whereIstand Blog

I share Donovan’s doubt about how possible it is to know the difference between when a government is simply displaying a representation of characters associated with law-giving and when they are defining/establishing law via these representations.

In this case intention is unknowable.

But what the court assumes is that the government, and anything placed on government property, is capable of simply presenting a religious representation without establishing the thing represented. I suggest the government cannot be neutral because it is by nature political.

When the courthouse or Capitol consents to a representation of Moses or Mohammed or Hammurabi or whomever presenting laws, the government is legitimating those figures and their ideologies - in effect saying yes these are law-givers, and worthy of a bass-relief statue/engraving in our finite space. That Rehnquist can assert for the Texas Case "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause," is ridiculous and frightening. Promoting a religious message is exactly what establishment is, and the dissenting opinion said as much. The only thing that could save this from Disestablishment folly is the seeking of a "secular purpose;" to this end Justice Breyer, the swing voter in the two cases at hand suggests that the Ten Commandments have a "broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage" and Rehnquist concurs saying: "the Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning."

Of course they do, but history isn’t neutral either, neither is morality nor culture. These are things that are used politically everyday to further agendas. This case is no different. I agree the Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning, but undeniably history is able to have a religious meaning. History is not necessary secular either. The court assumes it is, and this is their true folly. Does it matter how broad the context of the moral, historical, or cultural message is? as though any of these can be truly divorced from the religion that runs throughout each.

The only historical evidence of Moses or the Ten Commandments comes from a religious text, or a text that in a certain context, hell, multiple contexts, is religious. How does the majority opinion get around this? By asserting history - which they give the veneer of neutral authority.

The distinction they make is of degree, not kind: differing from an earlier Kentucky ruling that struck a requirement for classrooms to have copies of the Ten Commandments posted, Rehnquist said the Texas display "is a far more passive use of those texts," than the earlier Kentucky case, and apparently the new one. It’s the same  texts, in similar - government-owned - contexts, but one is deemed more passive and one more (I assume) aggressive. I see Scalia’s point that the court has set a precedent that won’t keep similar cases from appearing again because the court has failed to be definitive, as they are the only judges of what is passive enough to not be government establishment.

I don’t believe religion should be swept under the rug of this country, more to the point, I don’t think it’s possible to do so. I don’t mind religious displays visible to the public - without them there would be no Nativity displays out of which to steal the baby Jesus at Christmas time (only in keeping with the 2nd Commandment mind you). I don’t get offended at seeing churches - in fact I’m rather fond of looking at churches. They have their place, and it’s not on government-owned property. There is some grey area in government-religion interaction we have to sort out, but the ten commandments on government-owned property is blindingly white as establishment.

Also, if I wore a hat regularly, I would also tip it to Justice O’Connor.

This has been Andy D

I share Donovan’s doubt about how possible it is to know the difference between when a government is simply displaying a representation of characters associated with law-giving and when they are defining/establishing law via these representations.

In this case intention is unknowable.

But what the court assumes is that the government, and anything placed on government property, is capable of simply presenting a religious representation without establishing the thing represented. I suggest the government cannot be neutral because it is by nature political.

When the courthouse or Capitol consents to a representation of Moses or Mohammed or Hammurabi or whomever presenting laws, the government is legitimating those figures and their ideologies - in effect saying yes these are law-givers, and worthy of a bass-relief statue/engraving in our finite space. That Rehnquist can assert for the Texas Case "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause," is ridiculous and frightening. Promoting a religious message is exactly what establishment is, and the dissenting opinion said as much. The only thing that could save this from Disestablishment folly is the seeking of a "secular purpose;" to this end Justice Breyer, the swing voter in the two cases at hand suggests that the Ten Commandments have a "broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage" and Rehnquist concurs saying: "the Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning."

Of course they do, but history isn’t neutral either, neither is morality nor culture. These are things that are used politically everyday to further agendas. This case is no different. I agree the Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning, but undeniably history is able to have a religious meaning. History is not necessary secular either. The court assumes it is, and this is their true folly. Does it matter how broad the context of the moral, historical, or cultural message is? as though any of these can be truly divorced from the religion that runs throughout each.

The only historical evidence of Moses or the Ten Commandments comes from a religious text, or a text that in a certain context, hell, multiple contexts, is religious. How does the majority opinion get around this? By asserting history - which they give the veneer of neutral authority.

The distinction they make is of degree, not kind: differing from an earlier Kentucky ruling that struck a requirement for classrooms to have copies of the Ten Commandments posted, Rehnquist said the Texas display "is a far more passive use of those texts," than the earlier Kentucky case, and apparently the new one. It’s the same  texts, in similar - government-owned - contexts, but one is deemed more passive and one more (I assume) aggressive. I see Scalia’s point that the court has set a precedent that won’t keep similar cases from appearing again because the court has failed to be definitive, as they are the only judges of what is passive enough to not be government establishment.

I don’t believe religion should be swept under the rug of this country, more to the point, I don’t think it’s possible to do so. I don’t mind religious displays visible to the public - without them there would be no Nativity displays out of which to steal the baby Jesus at Christmas time (only in keeping with the 2nd Commandment mind you). I don’t get offended at seeing churches - in fact I’m rather fond of looking at churches. They have their place, and it’s not on government-owned property. There is some grey area in government-religion interaction we have to sort out, but the ten commandments on government-owned property is blindingly white as establishment.

Also, if I wore a hat regularly, I would also tip it to Justice O’Connor.

This has been Andy D

whereIstand Tags

• nick
• Donovan
• Should public displays of religious content be permitted?

Check this.

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Check this.

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• Is there a fundamental disparity between genders on the issues of sexuality and reproduction as manifested in law and policy?

But I checked No because I don’t think specific circumstances are necessary, as long as death isn’t chosen on that much of a whim.

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But I checked No because I don’t think specific circumstances are necessary, as long as death isn’t chosen on that much of a whim.

This has been Andy D.

whereIstand Tags

• Should the right to death be limited to those with terminal illness, chronic pain, or other specific circumstances?

I agree with Nick on this one. I don’t think intention nor desire can be quantified, but they should be personally qualified with enough conviction and a concerted effort of will and reason before making a decision involving death. This does not discount emotion - in fact I think emotion has most to do with it, and is an important thing to factor into suicide, one which cannot actually be factored out I suspect.

This has been Andy D

I agree with Nick on this one. I don’t think intention nor desire can be quantified, but they should be personally qualified with enough conviction and a concerted effort of will and reason before making a decision involving death. This does not discount emotion - in fact I think emotion has most to do with it, and is an important thing to factor into suicide, one which cannot actually be factored out I suspect.

This has been Andy D

whereIstand Tags

• nick
• Should the right to death be limited to those with terminal illness, chronic pain, or other specific circumstances?

Proselytizing becomes imposing when you can’t change the channel on those televangelist stations, which door-to-door practice of religion spreading comes dangerously close to.

I wasn’t actually being mean to Lar in Donovan’s reference, I was being mean to Donovan who disclosed that he used to be a missionary.

I understand Donovan’s interest in balancing the government interests with religious liberty, but I wonder why the government would be more interested in saving lives than protecting religious freedom - murder is not strictly unconstitutional, but restricting free exercise is. So how does one get to this balance? It seems that such is accomplished much in the same way the exceptions to free speech have been imposed - in some extra-Constitutional manner. Donovan takes it as common-sense of some social contract that life is part of the government’s interest, but the government doesn’t constitutionally protect life, while it does Constitutionally protect religion. In fact, murder or killing is actually condoned in certain situations - like in self-defense, police actions, and wartimes - why not in a consensual religious practice?

Of course it makes sense to restrict this kind of activity, and in my anti-religious way, I certainly would not want to be sacrificed, but if one chooses death in this way, then they have the right to go out like that.

I just want to point out that when one defends free-exercise, one must recognize that their argument is going to boil to a matter of degree, not type. Donovan presented a hypo about a man marrying two young girls, molesting them and then claiming religious freedom as his defense. Donovan’s presentation of this hypo to debunk my critique of marriage as a religious institution is as ridiculous as my hypo here (and it is ridiculous, I realize). Donovan raised that case to argue that government belongs involved in marriage. I raise this case to ask what is in fact included under free exercise, where do these inclusions and exclusions come from (because its not from the Constitution - there are no exceptions mentioned therein for either religion, except for the disestablishment clause, nor for speech). How is proselytizing different from sacrifice, as both are a matter of belief in practice. I also mention that the Courts’ distinction in treating religious belief and practice differently is a very western concept. Most cultures do not divorce belief and practice, nor do most divorce religion from culture/world view at all. Just so everyone knows that the Courts are coming from a very specific place in their definitions, neither necessarily better nor worse than anywhere else.

This has been Andy D.

Proselytizing becomes imposing when you can’t change the channel on those televangelist stations, which door-to-door practice of religion spreading comes dangerously close to.

I wasn’t actually being mean to Lar in Donovan’s reference, I was being mean to Donovan who disclosed that he used to be a missionary.

I understand Donovan’s interest in balancing the government interests with religious liberty, but I wonder why the government would be more interested in saving lives than protecting religious freedom - murder is not strictly unconstitutional, but restricting free exercise is. So how does one get to this balance? It seems that such is accomplished much in the same way the exceptions to free speech have been imposed - in some extra-Constitutional manner. Donovan takes it as common-sense of some social contract that life is part of the government’s interest, but the government doesn’t constitutionally protect life, while it does Constitutionally protect religion. In fact, murder or killing is actually condoned in certain situations - like in self-defense, police actions, and wartimes - why not in a consensual religious practice?

Of course it makes sense to restrict this kind of activity, and in my anti-religious way, I certainly would not want to be sacrificed, but if one chooses death in this way, then they have the right to go out like that.

I just want to point out that when one defends free-exercise, one must recognize that their argument is going to boil to a matter of degree, not type. Donovan presented a hypo about a man marrying two young girls, molesting them and then claiming religious freedom as his defense. Donovan’s presentation of this hypo to debunk my critique of marriage as a religious institution is as ridiculous as my hypo here (and it is ridiculous, I realize). Donovan raised that case to argue that government belongs involved in marriage. I raise this case to ask what is in fact included under free exercise, where do these inclusions and exclusions come from (because its not from the Constitution - there are no exceptions mentioned therein for either religion, except for the disestablishment clause, nor for speech). How is proselytizing different from sacrifice, as both are a matter of belief in practice. I also mention that the Courts’ distinction in treating religious belief and practice differently is a very western concept. Most cultures do not divorce belief and practice, nor do most divorce religion from culture/world view at all. Just so everyone knows that the Courts are coming from a very specific place in their definitions, neither necessarily better nor worse than anywhere else.

This has been Andy D.

whereIstand Tags

• andrea
• JoeC
• nick
• Amir
• Lar
• Publius
• GuyCatelli
• Gab
• Donovan
• Should morality and religion play a role in the making of public policy?
• Are Democrats unfairly blocking President Bush’s nominations?
• What legal rights to a relationship of consenting adults should be available for same-sex couples?
• Should a woman in the first trimester have unrestricted legal access without exceptions to terminate her pregnancy?
• Should a person have a basic right to death?